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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. ; 
GEORGE LARSEN, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Appeal No. 20070187-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18a-l(l)(a) (2003) and UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE 3(a) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal from the Judgment 
entered on February 2,2007 (the "Judgment"), by the Seventh Judicial District Court in and 
for San Juan County, State of Utah, in this case involving Criminal Mischief, a Class B 
Misdemeanor; Criminal Trespass, a Class B Misdemeanor; and Disorderly Conduct, a Class 
C Misdemeanor. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Was the evidence presented sufficient to sustain the conviction of 
Criminal Mischief? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence 
claim "is highly deferential to a jury verdict." State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66,f 29, 
122 P.3d 639. "[This Court] begin[s] by reviewing 'the evidence and all inferences 
which may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" 
Id. (citations omitted). "[This Court] will reverse a jury verdict for insufficient 
evidence only if [it] determine[s] that 'reasonable minds could not have reached the 
verdict.'" Id. (citations omitted). Stated another way, "[this Court] will reverse a jury 
verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in 
a light most favorable to the verdict, [it] find[s] that the evidence to support the 
verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the 
verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. Lopez. 2001 UT App 123,^ [ 10, 24 
P.3d993. 
ISSUE II: Was the evidence presented sufficient to sustain the conviction of 
Criminal Trespass? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review for a sufficiency of the 
evidence claim "is highly deferential to a jury verdict." State v. Workman, 2005 UT 
66,f 29, 122 P.3d 639. "[This Court] begin[s] by reviewing 'the evidence and all 
inferences which may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict.'" Id. (citations omitted). "[This Court] will reverse a jury verdict for 
insufficient evidence only if [it] determine[s] that 'reasonable minds could not have 
reached the verdict.'" Id. (citations omitted). Stated another way, "[this Court] will 
reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn 
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therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, [it] find[s] that the evidence to 
support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to 
make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. Lopez, 2001 UT App 
123,1fl0,24P.3d993. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. V 
B. UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 7 
C. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-106 
D. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-206 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 27, 2007, George Larsen ("Larsen") was charged by Information in 
the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand County with being a Restricted Person 
in Possession of Dangerous Weapon, a class A Misdemeanor; Criminal Mischief, a class B 
Misdemeanor; Criminal Trespass, a class B Misdemeanor; and Disorderly Conduct, a class 
C Misdemeanor. R001,R002. 
A bench trial was held on January 23, 2007, at which time Larsen was found guilty 
of Criminal Mischief, Criminal Trespass, and Disorderly Conduct. R040- R041. Larsen was 
found not guilty of being a Restricted Person in Possession of a Dangerous Weapon. Id. On 
February 2,2007, the trial court entered its Judgment sentencing Larsen to two (2) terms of 
six (6) months in the Grand County Jail to be served concurrently on the convictions of 
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Criminal Mischief and Criminal Trespass and ninety (90) days in the Grand County Jail to 
be served consecutively on the Disorderly Conduct conviction. R0043-R0044. 
On February 22, 2007, Larsen filed his Notice of Appeal R0055. On February 23, 
2007, Larsen filed his Amended Notice of Appeal. R0062. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. State's Witness Tamela Hudyma's Testimony 
Tamela Hudyma ("Hudyma") testified that she lives at 610 Cane Creek Boulevard, 
#85, and was living there on November 15th, 2006. Tr. at p. 6. Hudyma testified that on said 
date, though she had been given a No-contact Order from Judge Manley prohibiting her from 
contacting George Larsen ("Larsen"), Larsen came to the door. Id. Hudyma testified that 
she understood she could not have contact with Larsen so she called the police. Id. 
Hudyma testified that when Larsen came to the door, she was talking to her daughter 
on the phone. Tr. at p. 7. Hudyma testified that she told her daughter that Larsen was at the 
door, so she would have to hang up and call the police department. Id. Hudyma testified that 
she did not remember whether Larsen had banged, knocked, or yelled to alert her that he was 
at the door, but she knew it was Larsen when she saw him through the peephole. Id. 
Hudyma testified that she called the police and then Larsen pushed in the door and 
threw down a card. Tr. at p. 8. Hudyma testified that the door had been previously damaged, 
and that it was further damaged by Larsen when he pushed it in. Id. Hudyma testified that 
she then heard somebody on the stairs, and Larsen came back up and she told him that she 
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had the No-Contact Order and that she had called the police department. Id. Hudyma 
testified that Larsen wanted to talk to her, that at one point he said that he was going to go 
downstairs and wait for the officers to show up, but that the officers showed up before he 
went back downstairs. Tr. at p. 9. 
Hudyma testified that when the officers showed up, she and Larsen were in her 
bathroom. Id. Hudyma testified that ever since she suffered a head injury, whenever she 
doesn't know what to do, she goes into the bathroom for some reason. Id. Hudyma testified 
that she did not recall any yelling and screaming between her and Larsen when the officers 
arrived. Id. Upon being shown the State's Exhibit No. 1, a series of photographs, Hudyma 
testified that Larsen had broken the lock that night as well as the tape that she had previously 
applied to the door to prevent it from separating due to prior damage. Tr. at p. 10. 
Hudyma testified that she got a protective order the next day. Id. Hudyma testified 
that though she was not afraid of Larsen, she was fearful of what Larsen might do next in his 
desperation of wanting to talk to her. Id. Hudyma testified that she thought it was best to 
get a protective order because she continued to get in trouble. Id. Hudyma testified that she 
had not necessarily stated in the protective order that she was afraid. Tr. at p. 11. Hudyma 
testified that she obtained the protective order because she thought it would eliminate any 
confusion as to who could talk to who and when. Id. Hudyma testified that the State's 
Exhibit No. 2 was her protective order, that she had made the statement therein, and that she 
had sworn to it. Tr. at pp. 12, 14. After reading the protective order silently to herself, 
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Hudyma testified that reading it had refreshed her memory, and that, as the protective order 
said, she had been fearful for herself and for Larsen because she did not want either of them 
to get into any further trouble for trying to talk to the other. Tr. at pp. 12-13. Hudyma 
testified that she was afraid of what might happen in the future if this was not resolved. Tr. 
at p. 13. 
Hudyma testified that Paragraph (F) of the Protective Order was her sworn statement 
on the day she obtained said order. Tr. at p. 14. Hudyma testified that when Larsen came 
through her door she was afraid. Tr. at p. 15. Hudyma read the following statement from 
her protective order: "Breaking in my door makes me fearful for myself, and also for him, 
for I do not know what will happen next." Id. Hudyma testified that she has had her door 
repaired since the night Larsen broke it, and that the repairs had cost two-hundred sixty 
dollars ($260.00). Hudyma testified that the door that was broken belonged to her and not to 
Larsen. Id. 
Hudyma testified that she is involved in a proceeding in juvenile court with the 
Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS"), and that prior to the night in question with 
Larsen, her child had been removed from her custody. Tr. at p. 16. Hudyma testified that 
she had been required to do a urinalysis at the courthouse which came up initially as a 
positive, but that she found out a week and a half later that it was found by the lab to be a 
false positive. Tr. at pp. 16-17. Hudyma testified that the juvenile court judge, Judge 
Manley, was uncomfortable with Hudyma being in Larsen's presence and with her daughter 
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being exposed to Larsen because the judge believed Larsen had a prior drug history. Tr. at 
p. 17. Hudyma testified that, to her knowledge, Judge Manley's discomfort with her being 
around Larsen or with her daughter being exposed to Larsen had nothing to do with any 
feeling that Larsen was a danger to Hudyma or a physical danger to her or her daughter. Id. 
Hudyma testified that the Order removing her daughter from her included the No-Contact 
Order restraining her from having any contact with Larsen. Tr. at p. 17-18. Hudyma testified 
that by stating that she was "afraid" meant she knew the situation was bad and did not want 
the situation with the No-contact Orders or with DCFS getting worse. Tr. at pp. 18-19. 
Hudyma testified that she was not afraid that her own physical safety would get worse. Id. 
Hudyma testified that Larsen had never lived in her home, but that she had lived with 
him in his home. Tr. at p. 19. Hudyma testified that the last time that she and Larsen had 
lived together was in February of 2006. Id. Hudyma testified that Larsen still had some of 
his personal possessions in her home, including his fish tank and a pet Bearded Dragon that 
was originally supposed to belong to Hudyma's daughter, and for which they had all 
contributed funds. Id. Hudyma testified that Larsen had kept some of his movies as well as 
some of his clothes in her home at times when she was doing his laundry. Tr. at p. 20. 
Hudyma testified that Larsen had occasionally spent the night at her home in the past, but, 
more often, she would go to his house to spend the night. Id. Hudyma testified that at one 
time Larsen had a key to her home, but that on the night in question he did not have a key, 
7 
however, she testified that she had problems with the locks and nobody used a key. Tr. at 
p. 20-21. 
Hudyma testified that her door had been cracked prior to the night in question. Tr. at 
p. 21. Hudyma testified that she thought, because of the door's splitting, that the door was 
hollow with a wooden core and a metal shell, and would swell in the summer causing it to 
stick. Id. Hudyma testified that the photos of the door in State's Exhibit No. 1 showed both 
the damage that had occurred prior to the night in question, as well as the damage done by 
Larsen. Id. Hudyma testified that the door had been taped because of the crack in the 
swelling. Id. Hudyma testified that she did not know if the police had removed the tape 
prior to taking the picture. Tr. at p. 21 -22. Hudyma testified that there was still tape on the 
door when she came out of the bathroom after the police arrived. Tr. at p. 22. Hudyma 
testified that said tape was visible in the photographs in State's Exhibit No. 1, and that she 
did not know whether any tape had been removed. Id. 
Hudyma testified that she did not see Larsen break the lock or kick in the door. Tr. 
at p. 22-23. Hudyma testified that she did not see any boot prints on the door. Tr. at p. 23. 
Hudyma testified that, other than the usual sounds of people going up and down the stairs, 
she did not see or hear another individual with Larsen, though she had been told that there 
was somebody else on the stairs. Id. Hudyma testified that somebody had come to the door, 
and she looked through the peephole and that Larsen was there. Id. Hudyma testfied that she 
did not recall stating that Larsen had come up with anyone. Tr. at p. 24. 
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Hudyma testified that on the night of the incident, while what had occurred was still 
fresh in her mind, she had made out a written statement. Tr. at p. 24-25. Hudyma testified 
that she remembered hearing the wood crack on the front door as Larsen kicked in the door. 
Tr. at p. 25. Hudyma testified that the statement presented to her in court by the State was 
in fact the statement she had made and that, after reading it, her memory about what she had 
heard that night was refreshed. Id. Hudyma testified that, while she was in the bathroom and 
Larsen was at her door, she heard a crack that sounded like wood splitting. Tr. at p. 25-26. 
Hudyma testified that she had not met in person with Detective Craig Shumway 
("Shumway") about the incident, but that she had talked with him on the phone. Tr. at p. 
26. Hudyma testified that she had told Shumway that the door had been damaged before the 
incident, because of the sticking. Id. Hudyma testified that when Shumway had said that he 
might need her to come in and make out another statement, she had told him she already had, 
and he never got back to her. Id. Hudyma testified that she later received a subpoena. Id. 
Hudyma testified that she did not want any misunderstandings and that she told Shumway 
that she would not be pursuing the matter. Id. 
Hudyma testified that her landlord had mentioned that she did not want Larsen on the 
property. Tr. at p. 27. Hudyma testified that the Utah Department of Workforce Services 
had helped her to get into her housing, and that she did not recall anyone from Workforce 
Services, including an employee named Belinda, ever objecting to Larsen's presence on the 
property or specifying whether any specific person could be there. Tr. at p. 27-28. 
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B. State's Witness Craig Shumway's Testimony 
Shumway testified that he had been employed by the Moab City Police Department 
for twelve (12) years. Tr. at p. 28-29. Shumway testified that he had wanted to talk to 
Hudyma and made a phone call to her home on the afternoon of the 11th of January, 2007, 
as well as going to her home and leaving a business card. Tr. at p. 29. Shumway testified 
that Hudyma called him back and he asked her about the door. Id. 
Shumway testified that, in their phone conversation, he told Hudyma that he had some 
photographs he wanted her to see depicting the damage and asked her if the damage was 
there prior to the night in question. Tr. at pp. 30, 31. Shumway testfied that Hudyma told 
him on the phone that the damage was not there prior to the incident, but that the door had 
been sticking. Id. Shumway testified that Hudyma told him there was nobody else with 
Larsen the night of the incident. Tr. at p. 30. Shumway testified that he asked Hudyma if 
she would make a written statement, and that she said she had made out a statement that night 
and was not going to make out another statement. Id. Shumway testified that Hudyma told 
him she did not want to pursue charges any longer. Tr. at pp. 30-31. 
Shumway testified that he did not show Hudyma any of the pictures as his 
conversation with Hudyma about the damage to the door had transpired over the phone. Tr. 
at p. 31. Shumway reiterated his testimony that Hudyma had told him that the door was not 
previously damaged, but that it had been sticking. Id. 
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C. State's Witness Officer Aaron Woodard's Testimony 
Officer Aaron Woodard ("Woodard") testified that he is employed by Moab City 
Police Department and has been in law enforcement for three (3) years. Tr. at p. 32. 
Woodard testified that he was working on the evening of the 15th of November, 2006, and 
responded to a call at approximately 7:00 pm to go to Hudyma's home. Tr. at p. 33. 
Woodard testified that he was advised by Dispatch that there was a disturbance at Hudyma's 
home, that Larsen was there, and that Hudyma had advised Dispatch that Larsen was not 
supposed to be there due to a protective order. Id. Woodard testified that he and Deputy 
Rogers ("Rogers") both showed up to Hudyma's residence at the same time. Id. Woodard 
testified that he and Rogers were the very first two to arrive on the scene. Tr. at p. 38. 
Woodard testified that when they came up the stairs they saw no one, but noticed that the 
door that was damaged was open, and they announced who they were and went in. Tr. at p. 
33-34. Woodard testified that they could hear arguing and that he recognized Larsen's voice, 
which was agitated. Tr. at p. 34. Woodard testified that he then saw Larsen come around 
the comer from the bathroom with Hudyma. Id. Woodard testified that they started 
questioning Larsen in an effort to find out what was happening. Tr. at p. 35. 
Woodard testified that Larsen said that he was there to drop off a letter. Id. Woodard 
testified that Larsen told them it was the fault of law enforcement that the child was taken 
out of the house and that he and Hudyma were having problems. Id. Woodard testified that 
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he and Rogers asked Larsen to calm down due to his agitation, and to place his hands on the 
wall. Id. 
Woodard testified that he and Rogers feared because of Larsen's behavior that matters 
could worsen. Id. Woodard testified that Larsen kept bringing his hands down, so they 
placed him in handcuffs for their safety. Id. Woodard testified that, after Larsen was placed 
in handcuffs, he was still very agitated and continued blaming them for what had taken place. 
Id. Woodard testified that Hudyma was not considered agitated in a way that would 
compromise her safety or well being, as far as he knew. Tr. at p. 39. 
Woodard testified that he and Rogers did a clear pat-down on Larsen and upon doing 
so they found a knife on Larsen's right hip in a leather scabbard. Tr. at p. 35. Woodard 
testified that they confiscated the knife marked as State's Exhibit No. 4, and were concerned 
about it because it was not the normal, pocket-size knife that would normally be in 
someone's pocket. Tr. at p. 36. Woodard testified that the knife was a full-size knife, not 
a folding knife, that he thought would be called a hunting knife, and that he did not believe 
the scabbard it was in had a snap, and that he did not take the scabbard from Larsen. Tr. at 
p. 39. 
Woodard testified that he had Dispatch run a criminal history check on Larsen to see 
if he would be someone who is restricted from carrying a weapon, and it was found on the 
front page of the criminal history that Larsen had been convicted of felony. Tr. at p. 36-37. 
Woodard testified that, after he took the knife from Larsen because of his agitation, they 
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walked Larsen outside, placed him in the patrol car, and transported him to the sheriffs 
office. Tr. at p. 37. Woodard testified that at the sheriffs office, after Larsen was turned 
over to the booking staff, he was still very agitated, and that Woodard could see and hear him 
in his cell yelling, banging on the walls, making a loud disturbance, and asking why they kept 
doing this. Tr. at p. 37-38. Woodard testified that he did not take the photos attached to 
State's Exhibit No. 1, nor was he there when the photos were taken because he had 
transported Larsen to jail. Tr. at p. 39. 
D. State's Witness Zane Lammert's Testimony 
Zane Lambert ("Lambert") testified that he was employed by the Grand County 
Sheriffs Office, and that he had been in law enforcement for twelve (12) years. Tr. at p. 40-
41. Lambert testified that he was working on November 15th, 2006, and responded to a call 
at Hudyma's apartment. Tr. at p. 41. 
Lambert testified that this incident was the not the first to which he had responded at 
that residence. Tr. at p. 45. Lambert testified that, since he did not think the city would have 
a backup officer available for the incident and since the incident involved Larsen whose 
demeanor was known to Lambert, he responded to the call to Hudyma's residence. Id. 
Lambert testified that he believed he learned it was Larsen from Dispatch. Id. Lambert 
testified that he did not know where Larsen lived, but that he had seen him there and at his 
father's house. Tr. at pp. 45-46. Lambert testified that he is familiar with the location of her 
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apartment, and that he arrived just a few minutes after the call. Tr. at p. 41. Lambert 
testified that he was the last person who responded to the scene of the incident. Tr. at p. 44. 
Lambert testified that upon arrival, he found Woodard and Rogers walking Larsen out 
of the building and down the stairs in handcuffs. Tr. at pp. 41-42. Lambert testified that he 
stood there while they walked by and then helped Woodard walk Larsen to the car, because 
Larsen was not calm, but appeared angry and very upset about their presence. Tr. at pp. 42-
43. Lambert testified that Larsen was a little bit combative and was saying profanities 
towards them. Tr. at p. 43. Lambert testified that he imagined that Larsen's profanity 
towards him was in response to prior animosity rather than to something Lambert was doing 
that night, and that Lambert had been to the residence during the prior summer because of 
a problem with Larsen. Tr. at p. 46. 
Lambert testified that he helped Larsen get seated in the car safely because he was 
concerned with officer safety for Woodard. Tr, at p. 43. Lambert testified that he talked to 
Woodard briefly and then Woodard took Larsen to jail. Id. Lambert testified that he went 
back upstairs, obtained a statement from Hudyma, and took the pictures of the broken door 
identified as State's Exhibit No. 1. Id. Lambert testified that the photographs fairly and 
accurately represent what the door looked like on that night. Tr. at p. 44. 
Lambert testified that Hudyma told him that Larsen had broken the door. Tr. at p. 43. 
Lambert testified that Hudyma said that Larsen had knocked the door in once before, and had 
torn the door off. Tr. at pp. 43-44. Lambert testified that the door had been repaired with 
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tape. Id. Lambert testified that he did not know if the door had been altered by anyone or 
if anyone had opened or shut the door or tried to manipulate it or do anything with it before 
he arrived, or from the time that the officers arrived to the time that he had taken the 
photographs. Tr. at pp. 44-45. Lambert testified that he did not touch the door or remove 
any tape from the door. Tr. at p. 45. Lambert testified that when he arrived, the door was 
the way it appeared in the photographs. Id. 
E. State's Witness Deputy Deston Rogers' Testimony 
Deputy Deston Rogers ("Rogers") testified that he is employed by the Grand County 
Sheriffs Office, and has been in law enforcement for four and one-half (4 14) years. Tr. at 
pp. 46-47. Rogers testified that he was called to Hudyma's apartment at 610 Cane Creek, 
Apartment A-5, on November 15th, 2006. Tr. at pp. 47-48. Rogers testified that he thought 
he and Woodard were the first to arrive at the scene, and that he and Woodard arrived at 
about the same time. Tr. at p. 48, 50-51. Rogers testified that when he arrived he went up 
the stairwell to the apartment and could hear loud, argumentative voices inside the apartment. 
Tr. at p. 48. 
Rogers testified that, before they entered the apartment, they noticed that the door had 
been damaged as if somebody had kicked and pushed it in. Tr. at p. 48, 51. Rogers testified 
that the door lock, a dead bolt, had been "busted out." Tr. at p. 49, 51. Rogers testified that 
the damage to the door appeared to be fresh. Tr. at p. 48. Rogers testified that there was 
fresh wood laying on the carpet of the apartment. Tr. at p. 51. 
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Rogers testified he did not know how much damage there had been to the door prior 
to the incident. Tr. at p. 51. Rogers testified that there had been tape over the door and that 
he could see where the crack had actually cracked the tape. Tr. at p. 49, 51. Rogers testified 
that the photographs in State's Exhibit No. 1 were pictures of the damage to the door that he 
had seen that night, and that the photos accurately reflected what he saw as he went through 
the door that night. Tr. at p. 49. 
Rogers testified that, after they heard yelling and had gone through the broken door, 
they identified themselves as law enforcement. Id. Rogers testified that Larsen and Hudyma 
came out of the bathroom area, and that Larsen seemed very irritated that law enforcement 
was there. Id. Rogers testified that, while Woodard remained with Larsen, he followed 
Hudyma back into the bathroom to talk to her and find out what was going on. Id. 
Larsen testified that Hudyma said that she had been in the bathroom and heard the 
door pop. Id. Rogers testified that after he talked to Hudyma, they went back out and he 
talked to Larsen, who was irate. Tr. at p. 50. 
Rogers testified that they became concerned for the safety of the officers and 
instructed Larsen a couple of times to put his hands up on the wall. Id. Rogers testified that 
Larsen refused to comply several times, so they decided to place him into handcuffs for 
safety reasons until they could keep the situation under control. Id. Rogers testified that at 
that point, they learned from Hudyma that there had been an argument. Id. Rogers testified 
that Larsen had mentioned something about trying to put a card in the house, and that there 
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actually was a card laying on the floor. Id. Rogers testified that, at that point, they decided 
they would arrest Larsen. Id, Rogers testified that Larsen refused to go with Rogers but 
would walk with Woodard to the patrol car, so Woodard took him down. Id. 
F. George Larsen's Testimony 
Larsen stated that Judge Manley had verbally restrained Hudyma from seeing Larsen, 
but that thirty (30) seconds after the court, Hudyma walked out and went with Larsen to see 
Sarah, her daughter. Tr. at p. 62. Larsen stated that he told Hudyma that she could not do 
that. Id. Larsen stated that Hudyma told him that the only way she could get her child back 
was to get a restraining order, that she had applied for one, and that she was not able to 
obtain one because there had been no threats. Id. Larsen stated that on the night of the 
incident, he had gone to Hudyma's residence to give her the card to tell her he was leaving 
so that she could get her life in order and get her daughter back. Id. Larsen stated that his 
only intention in going over there had been to leave the card. Id. Larsen stated that he did 
not threaten or hurt Hudyma in any way, and that he had not meant to cause problems. Id. 
Larsen stated that he had thought it was the right thing to do so Hudyma could get her 
daughter back. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In order to challenge a court's factual findings, "'an appellant must first marshal all 
the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court 
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below."'Chen v. Stewart 2004 UT 82, f76, 100 P.3d 1177, (Utah 2004), citing Wilson 
Supply v. Fradan Mfg. Corp. 2002 UT 94 at ^ 21, 54 P.3d 1177. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-
106 sets forth the elements of Criminal Mischief as follows: 
(2) A person commits criminal mischief if the person: 
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys property 
with the intention of defrauding an insurer; 
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of another and as 
a result: 
(i) recklessly endangers: 
(A) human life; or 
(B) human health or safety; or 
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or impairment of 
any critical infrastructure; 
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another; or 
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object at or 
against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car, or 
caboose, whether moving or standing. 
(3) (a) (i) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a third degree felony, 
(ii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(A) is a class A misdemeanor, 
(iii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(B) is a class B misdemeanor, 
(iv) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(ii) is a second degree felony. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-206 sets forth the elements of criminal trespass as follows: 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not 
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204 
or a violation of Section 76-10-2402 regarding commercial terrorism: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any 
property, including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107; 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of another; 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on property 
as to which notice against entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone with 
apparent authority to act for the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders; or 
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(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders; or 
(c) he enters a condominium unit in violation of Subsection 57-8-7(7). 
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is a class B misdemeanor unless 
it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class A misdemeanor. 
In the instant matter, insufficient evidence exists to show that Larsen met the elements 
that are necessary to be convicted of Criminal Mischief and Criminal Trespass. The State 
failed to meet their burden of proving the elements of UTAH CODE ANN. §§76-6-106 and -
206. Larsen also had a possessory interest in the property, negating the element of each crime 
charged that Larsen's actions were unlawful in this matter. Therefore, the convictions of 
Larsen for criminal mischief and trespass cannot stand. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT THE ELEMENTS FOR A 
CONVICTION OF CRIMINAL MISCHIEF 
No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless each 
element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 362, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (emphasis added). The United States 
Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional status, linking it to both the 
Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 
Sullivan V.Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275,278 (1993); Winship. 397 U.S. at 362,364. "[T]he Due 
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 
Winship. 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). 
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In order to challenge a court's factual findings, 'an appellant must first marshal all the 
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court 
below.'"Chen v. Stewart 2004 UT 82, ^76, 100 P.3d 1177, (Utah 2004), citing Wilson 
Supply v. Fradan Mfg. Corp. 2002 UT 94 at U 21, 54 P.3d 1177. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-106 sets forth the elements of criminal mischief as follows: 
(2) A person commits criminal mischief if the person: 
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys property 
with the intention of defrauding an insurer; 
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of another and as 
a result: 
(i) recklessly endangers: 
(A) human life; or 
(B) human health or safety; or 
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or impairment of 
any critical infrastructure; 
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another, or 
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object at or 
against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car, or 
caboose, whether moving or standing. 
(3) (a) (i) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a third degree felony, 
(ii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(A) is a class A misdemeanor, 
(iii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(B) is a class B misdemeanor, 
(iv) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(ii) is a second degree felony. 
(Emphasis added). "Possessory interest'' is defined as, "the right to exert control over 
specific land to the exclusion of others, coupled with the intent to exercise that right." Gilbert 
Law Summaries, Pocket Size Law Dictionary, pp. 249. The Colorado Supreme Court 
provides helpful insight by stating that, "[t]he definition of property 'of another,' . . .states 
'[p]roperty is that of "another" if anyone other than the defendant has possessory or 
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proprietary interest therein.'" People v. Clayton. 728 P.2d 723, 726 (Colo. 1986). Similarly, 
this Court has determined that, "Model Penal Code § 223.0(7) defines 'property of another' 
to include 'property in which any person other than the actor has an interest which the actor 
is not privileged to infringe, regardless of the fact that the actor also has an interest in the 
property.'" State v. Larsen. 834 P.2d 586, 591, fn. 2 (Utah App. 1992). 
As is stated supra, in order for a person to be convicted on a charge of criminal 
mischief the person must intentionally or unlawfully tamper with the property of another and 
the result must recklessly endanger a human life or human health or safety or the person must 
intentionally damage, deface, or destroy the property of another. In this matter, insufficient 
evidence has been presented to met these elements. 
Tamela Hudyma, who was the girlfriend of Larsen at the time of the incident, testified 
that when Larsen came to the door, she was talking to her daughter on the phone. Tr. at p. 
7. Hudyma testified that she told her daughter that Larsen was at the door, so she would have 
to hang up and call the police department. Id. Hudyma testified that she did not remember 
whether Larsen had banged, knocked, or yelled to alert her that he was at the door, but she 
knew it was Larsen when she saw him through the peephole. Id. Hudyma testified that she 
called the police and then Larsen pushed in the door and threw down a card. Tr. at p. 8. 
Hudyma testified that the door had been previously damaged, and that it was further damaged 
by Larsen when he pushed it in. Id, Hudyma testified that she then heard somebody on the 
stairs, and Larsen came back up and she told him that she had the No-Contact Order and that 
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she had called the police department. Id. Hudyma testified that when the officers showed 
up, she and Larsen were in her bathroom. Tr. At p. 9. Hudyma testified that she did not 
recall any yelling and screaming between her and Larsen when the officers arrived. Id. 
Hudyma testified that her door had been cracked prior to the night in question. Tr. at p. 21. 
Hudyma testified that she thought, because of the door's splitting, that the door is hollow and 
has a wooden core with a metal shell, and that in the summer the door would swell badly, 
causing it to stick. Id. Hudyma testified that the photos of the door in State's Exhibit No. 
1 show both damage that had occurred prior to the night in question, as well as the damage 
done by Larsen. Id. Hudyma testified that the door had been taped because of the crack in 
the swelling. Id. Hudyma testified that she did not know if the police had removed the tape 
prior to taking the picture. Tr. at p. 21-22. Hudyma testified that there was still tape on the 
door when she came out of the bathroom after the police arrived. Tr. at p. 22. Hudyma 
testified that said tape was visible in the photographs in State's Exhibit No. 1, and that she 
did not know whether any tape had been removed. Id. 
Hudyma testified that she was not afraid for her physical safety. Tr. At p. 18-19. The 
State attempted to prove that Larsen damaged the door by kicking in the door in anger, 
however, the testimony by the Hudyma reflects that she herself knew that the door had been 
damaged prior to the incident in question. The officers also testified as to the damage of the 
door, and noticing the tape already on the door. Woodard testified that he and Rogers were 
the very first two to arrive on the scene. Tr. at p. 38. Woodard testified that when they came 
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up the stairs, they saw no one; the door, which was damaged, was open, and they announced 
who they were and went in. Tr. at p. 33-34. Woodard testified that they could hear arguing 
and that he recognized Larsen's voice, which was agitated. Tr. at p. 34. 
Officer Lambert testified that he that he went back upstairs, stood up there, got a 
statement from Hudyma, and took the pictures of the broken door identified as State's 
Exhibit No. One (1). Id. Lambert testified that the photographs fairly and accurately 
represent what the door looked like on the night in question. Tr. at p. 44. 
Insufficient evidence exists to support the fact the Larsen intentionally damaged the 
property of Hudyma during the incident at issue herein. First, testimony was offered Hudyma 
herself that she informed the officers that the door had been damaged previously and that 
tape had been placed on the door because of that damage. Hudyma had testified that the door 
was cracked and in the summer time would swell badly and this is why she had placed tape 
upon the door. Other than Hudyma testifying that she thought Larsen might have further 
damaged the door when he pushed the door in, no evidence was presented to show that 
Larsen intentionally pushed the door open with the intent to damage it. Hudyma additionally 
testified that the door could be opened without a key or much effort, evidencing that force 
was unnecessary. 
At trial Larsen himself stated to the trial court at trial that on the night of the incident, 
he had gone to Hudyma's residence to give her the card to tell her he was leaving so that she 
could get her life in order and get her daughter back. Tr. at p. 62. Larsen stated that his only 
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intention in going over there had been to leave the card. Id. Therefore, no evidence has been 
presented to show that Larsen had the necessary requisite intent to cause damage to the 
property of Hudyma. In fact, Larsen could not have the intent to damage Hudyma's property 
because he had a possessory interest in the property and he could not be charged with 
damaging his own property. 
Hudyma testified that Larsen had never lived in her home, but that she had lived with 
him in his home. Tr. at p. 19. Hudyma testified that the last time that she and Larsen had 
lived together was in February of 2006. Id. Hudyma testified that Larsen still had some of 
his personal possessions in her home, including his fish tank and a pet Bearded Dragon that 
was originally supposed to belong to Hudyma's daughter, and for which they had all 
contributed funds. Id. Hudyma testified that Larsen had kept some of his movies as well as 
some of his clothes in her home at times when she was doing his laundry. Tr. at p. 20. 
Hudyma testified that Larsen had occasionally spent the night at her home in the past, but, 
more often, she would go to his house to spend the night. Id. Hudyma testified that at one 
time Larsen had a key to her home, but that on the night in question, he did not have a key, 
and that because she had problems with the locks, nobody used a key. Tr. at p. 20-21. 
It is clearly evident that Larsen's possessions were on the property in the form of 
everyday-type items such as living necessities and entertainment, and that he had spent the 
night on several occasions. When coupled with the fact that Larsen had a key to the property, 
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it is clear that Larsen had a possessory interest in the property as a cohabitant of Hudyma's. 
Thus it is impossible for Larsen to be charged with damaging his own property. 
One cannot criminally damage property that they maintain a possessory interest in. 
As a result, Larsen cannot be found guilty of criminal mischief because the elements pursuant 
to Utah law have not been met and the testimony given at trial proves that Larsen had 
belongings and possessions on the property and that he was given a key to the property. 
Because Larsen had a possessory interest in the property, did not have the necessary requisite 
intent to damage the property and the evidence was inconclusive to show that Larsen actually 
caused further damage to the door, the evidence is insufficient to sustain Larsen's conviction 
for criminal mischief based upon intentional damage done to the property of another. 
The other element required for the crime of criminal mischief to have occurred was 
that there must be the intent to harm the health or safety of a person. It is not undisputed in 
this case that there was in fact a no-contact order issued between Larsen and Hudyma. 
However, the reasons for said No-Contact Order are not those of health and safely. Hudyma 
testified that on said date, though she had been given a No-Contact Order from Judge Manley 
prohibiting her from contacting Larsen, Larsen came to the door. Id. Hudyma testified that 
she understood she could not have contact with Larsen so she called the police. Id. 
Hudyma testified that when Larsen came to the door, she was talking to her daughter 
on the phone. Tr. at p. 7. Hudyma testified that she told her daughter that Larsen was at the 
door, so she would have to hang up and call the police department. Id. Hudyma testified that 
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she got a protective order the next day. Id. Hudyma testified that though she was not afraid 
of Larsen, she was fearful of what Larsen might do next in his desperation of wanting to talk 
to her. Id. Hudyma testified that she thought it was best to get a protective order because she 
continued to get in trouble in the juvenile matter. Id. Hudyma testified that she had not 
necessarily stated in the protective order that she was afraid. Tr. at p. 11. Hudyma testified 
that she obtained the protective order because she thought it would eliminate any confusion 
as to who could talk to who and when. Id. Hudyma testified that the State's Exhibit No. 2 
was her protective order, that she had made the statement therein, and that she had sworn to 
it Tr. at pp. 12, 14. After reading the protective order silently to herself, Hudyma testified 
that reading it had refreshed her memory, and that, as the protective order said, she had been 
fearful for herself and for Larsen because she didn't want either of them to get into any 
further trouble for trying to talk to the other. Tr. at pp. 12-13. Hudyma testified that she was 
afraid of what might happen in the future if this was not resolved. Tr. at p. 13. 
By Hudyma's own admission, she was not fearful of Larsen and, in fact, she got the 
No-Contact Order for the purpose of getting her child back in the other pending action 
against her. She was afraid of the consequences of having contact with Larsen because it 
could risk the outcome of the other action against her. It was not obtained by her because she 
felt her health and safety were at risk. Hudyma was not afraid for her health and safety, but 
afraid for the consequences that could occur if she continued to talk to Larsen, this is why 
she obtained a protective order so that she could work towards getting custody of her 
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daughter back and not get into further trouble by communicating with Larsen. She was not 
fearful of Larsen hurting her. Therefore, the element of intent to harm the health or safety 
of Hudyma has not been met. Having not presented sufficient evidence to meet the elements 
of criminal mischief beyond a reasonable doubt, Larsen's conviction for such should be 
overturned. 
II. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION OF 
CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-206 defines criminal trespass as follows: 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not 
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204 
or a violation of Section 76-10-2402 regarding commercial terrorism: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any 
property, including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107; 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of another; 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on property 
as to which notice against entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone with 
apparent authority to act for the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders; or 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders; or 
(c) he enters a condominium unit in violation of Subsection 57-8-7(7). 
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is a class B misdemeanor unless 
it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class A misdemeanor. 
(Emphasis added). In a defense based upon possessory interest as it pertains to the charge 
of criminal trespass, the Utah Supreme Court has upheld the charge when the prosecution has 
produced substantial evidence supporting the unlawful presence on the property. State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f37, 70 P.3d 111. Such evidence included documentation as to the 
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possession of the property such as tax deed, quiet title judgments, writ of restitution, 
defendant's prior trespass convictions, and testimony that defendant did not have permission 
to be on the land. Id. As shown further below, none of this type of evidence was presented 
in this matter. 
In order for Larsen to have been convicted of criminal trespass, the evidence must 
show that Larsen remained unlawfully on the property. No evidence has been presented that 
shows that Larsen entered or remained unlawfully on the property. First, Hudyma let Larsen 
into the residence on the night of the incident. She testified that she did not remember 
whether Larsen had banged, knocked, or yelled to alert her that he was at the door, but she 
knew it was Larsen when she saw him through the peephole. Tr. at p. 7. Also no evidence 
was presented to show that Hudyma ever asked Larsen to leave, allowing him to remain on 
the property. Second, as argued supra Larsen has possessory interest in the property. 
Hudyma testified that Larsen had never lived in her home, but that she had lived with him 
in his home. Tr. at p. 19. Hudyma testified that the last time that she and Larsen had lived 
together was in February of 2006. Id. Hudyma testified that Larsen still had some of his 
personal possessions in her home, including his fish tank and a pet Bearded Dragon that was 
originally supposed to belong to Hudyma's daughter, and for which they had all contributed 
funds. Id. Hudyma testified that Larsen had kept some of his movies as well as some of his 
clothes in her home at times when she was doing his laundry. Tr. at p. 20. Hudyma testified 
that Larsen had occasionally spent the night at her home in the past, but, more often, she 
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would go to his house to spend the night. Id. Hudyma testified that at one time Larsen had 
a key to her home, but that on the night in question, he did not have a key, and that because 
she had problems with the locks, nobody used a key. Tr. at p. 20-21. 
The State failed to present documentary evidence that the residence belonged to 
Hudyma and the testimony presented by Hudyma evidences that she allowed him to be on 
the property at the time of the alleged incident herein. Additionally, Hudyma did not offer 
any testimony that Larsen was not allowed to be on the property. As argued supra, the 
possessions he maintained on the property evidence that he was a co-habitant with possessory 
interest in the property itself. 
One cannot trespass on property that they maintain a possessory interest in. As a 
result, Larsen cannot be found guilty of criminal trespass because the State failed to meet the 
requisite elements pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-206 and the testimony and evidence 
provided proves that his belongings and possessions were present on the property and that 
he was given a key to location. Therefore, because insufficient evidence was presented to 
show that Larsen entered or remained unlawfully on the property that he had a possessory 
interest in and that he was admitted onto by Hudyma, Larsen's conviction for criminal 
trespass cannot stand. 
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CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Larsen respectfully requests that this Court 
overturn the Judgment and enter other such orders as this Court deems appropriate. 
DATED this 9th day of July 2007. 
William L. Schultz 
Attorney for George Larsen 
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